Constructing Crime: Neighborhood Characteristics and Police Recording Behavior by Varano, Sean P. et al.
Roger Williams University
DOCS@RWU
School of Justice Studies Faculty Papers School of Justice Studies
1-1-2009
Constructing Crime: Neighborhood
Characteristics and Police Recording Behavior
Sean P. Varano
Roger Williams University, svarano@rwu.edu
Joseph A. Schafer
Southern Illinois University-Carbondale
Jeffrey Michael Cancino
Texas State University-San Marcos
Marc L. Swatt
University of Nebraska at Omaha
Follow this and additional works at: http://docs.rwu.edu/sjs_fp
Part of the Criminology and Criminal Justice Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Justice Studies at DOCS@RWU. It has been accepted for inclusion in School of
Justice Studies Faculty Papers by an authorized administrator of DOCS@RWU. For more information, please contact mwu@rwu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Varano, Sean P., Joseph A. Schafer, Jeffrey M. Cancino, and Marc L. Swatt. 2009. "Constructing crime: Neighborhood characteristics
and police recording behavior." Journal of Criminal Justice 37 (6): 553-563.
Constructing crime: Neighborhood characteristics and police recording behavior
Sean P. Varano a,⁎, Joseph A. Schafer b, Jeffrey Michael Cancino c, Marc L. Swatt d
a School of Justice Studies, Roger Williams University, One Old Ferry Road, Bristol, RI 02809, United States
b Center for the Study of Crime, Southern Illinois University-Carbondale, Mailcode 4504, Carbondale, IL 62901-4505, United States
c Department of Criminal Justice, Texas State University-San Marcos, 601 University Drive, San Marcos, TX 78666, United States
d School of Criminology and Criminal Justice, University of Nebraska at Omaha, CPACS Room 218, 6001 Dodge Street, Omaha, NE 68182-0149, United States
a b s t r a c t
It has long been acknowledged that police ofﬁcers have substantial levels of discretion in their day-to-day
activities. There is a well developed body of literature that considers how this discretion is exercised across a
broad array of situations including the decision to arrest, use force, and grant citizen requests for ofﬁcial
action. Using both social disorganization and conﬂict theories as conceptual models, the purpose of this study
was to determine if neighborhood characteristics affect police reporting behavior across a wide cross-section
of reported call types. The ﬁndings indicated that reporting behavior widely varies across crime types with a
greater percentage of more serious crimes translated into ofﬁcial crime. Neighborhood characteristics did
affect reporting practices, but surprisingly only for more serious forms of disorder where discretion was
perceived to be less. The ﬁndings lent support for both social disorganization and conﬂict theories.
Theoretical implications are discussed.
© 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Introduction
Questions about when and how police use discretion have been a
pressing concern among scholars for decades. A large body of
literature seeks to explain discretionary decision-making by police,
particularly regarding the use of force and decision to arrest. Less
empirical consideration has focused on how police use discretion
when recording citizen reported calls for service into ofﬁcial crime,
despite the broad effect this decision has on victims and communities.
With a few notable exceptions (Block & Block, 1980; Goldstein, 1960;
Klinger & Bridges, 1997; Maxﬁeld, Lewis, & Szoc, 1980; McCleary,
Nienstedt, & Erven, 1982; Smith, 1986; Sung, 2002; Warner, 1997),
police responses to reported crime and the degree to which responses
are conditioned by neighborhood characteristics has received limited
attention from the research community. This is an important short-
coming in the literature because it is ultimately the police who have
the legal authority to determine which reported crimes are recorded as
crimes.
Understanding how police reconcile citizen initiated calls for ser-
vice yields important theoretical and policy implications. First,
recording decisions affect the “picture” of crime in an area since
ofﬁcial police reports become the source of public knowledge about
“actual” levels of crime (Klinger, 1997; Klinger & Bridges, 1997).1
Second, recording practices are important because police have amoral
(and in some instances, legal) obligation to formally acknowledge
victimization; generating a crime report is one mechanism for such
formalization. Third, aggregate police behavior represents a form of
resource allocation where the quality of responses reﬂects the level of
governmental services provided to victims and citizens. This is
particularly relevant for those concerned with social justice and the
equitable distribution of public goods. The present study examined the
relationships between neighborhood characteristics and aggregate
patterns of police responses to calls for service. The research aim was
to better understand howneighborhood characteristics predict ofﬁcial
recording practices by police. The term “translation rate”2 is used to
refer to the percentage of calls for service received by police that are
eventually recorded as ofﬁcial crime. Guided by social disorganization,
the goal was to ascertain whether police provide more or less
formalized public control in disadvantaged neighborhoods.
Background
Scholars interested in discretionary decision-making by police
have focused attention on a variety of outcomes including decisions
to arrest (Black, 1991; Worden & Myers, 2001), use force (Paoline &
Terrill, 2007), grant citizen requests for service/assistance (Mastrofski,
Snipes, Parks, &Maxwell, 2000), andmake court referrals (McCluskey,
Varano, Huebner, & Bynum, 2004).3 Less prevalent within the existing
literature is evidence about when and how police “translate” or record
reported crime into ofﬁcial crime. This is an important limitation since
calls for service represent a primemethod bywhich citizens come into
contact with police and the majority of known crimes are reported
directly to police by victims and witnesses. Warner (1997) argued
police decisions to record criminal incidents are important not only
because they “shape” the picture of crime, but they reﬂect lowvisibility
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decisions that often escape public scrutiny. Warner (1997) noted
“[d]ecisions that cannot be reviewed provide fertile soil for abuses of
discretionary decision-making” (p. 632).
The disjuncture between actual crime and ofﬁcial crime has been
duly noted. Donald Black (1980), for example, recognized ofﬁcial
crime as a product of police decision-making. While some have
treated the lack of correspondence between ofﬁcial crime rates and
actual crime rates as a mere methodological misfortune, Black
(1980) argued that “production of crime rates” is a sociological
phenomenon that is better conceptualized as a reﬂection of actual
social control compared to actual deviance (p. 66) (see also Kitsuse &
Cicourel, 1963). Law is bound by socio-legal traditions and norms; its
application is far from certain. Police responses to calls, like nearly
every other aspect of police work, are variable and inﬂuenced by
factors besides the availability and strength of evidence. The process
of translating calls for service into ofﬁcial police incidents is one of
many decision points in police work that is characterized by a high
level of discretion on the part of patrol ofﬁcers (Klinger & Bridges,
1997; McCleary et al., 1982; Warner, 1997) and this process reﬂects
the quantity and quality of law distributed within a society (Black,
1980). Ofﬁcers responding to 911 calls are faced with several options
when arriving at the scene of a reported crime or disturbance.
“Founded” crimes are categorized as those events that result in, at a
minimum, the generation of an ofﬁcial police report. Crimes may also
be coded as “unfounded” for several reasons; the most obvious is a
lack of sufﬁcient evidence. Black (1980) suggests that police recording
behavior is inﬂuenced by factors other than evidence including the
seriousness of the crime, complainants' preferences, complainants'
personal characteristics (including social status and deference), and
relational distance between victims and perpetrators (see also Block &
Block, 1980).
Recording decisions by police may further be inﬂuenced by
organizational factors. Ofﬁcers may use the “unfounded” code as a
way of avoiding paperwork or other types of work generated pursuant
to ofﬁcially recognizing an incident as a crime, a concept some refer to
as “load shedding” (Maxﬁeld et al., 1980; McCleary et al., 1982;
Pepinsky, 1976; Rubinstein, 1973; Sung, 2002). Pepinsky (1976) notes
ofﬁcer recording behavior is inﬂuenced by dispatcher expectations
about how calls should be handled. Maxﬁeld et al. (1980) attribute
variations in recording behavior to area work load; that is, recording
decreases as general work load (e.g., total calls for service) increases.
Importantly, the authors report this relationship is most evident for
less serious crime.
There is also reason to believe that police discretionary decision-
making is inﬂuenced by ecological factors. Black (1976) provided one
of the early articulations of how social settings can inﬂuence the
quantity, quality, and direction of law. This theoretical perspective
focuses on victims, offenders, and their relative positions within
society, but an underlying force within these dynamics is how ecology
might condition such relative positions. Klinger (1997, 2004) argues
that researchers tend to neglect the role of ecological factors in
explaining police behavior in favor of situational characteristics.
Klinger's contention draws on Herbert (1997) and Rubinstein (1973)
in advocating that a good deal of policing is organized around
geographic space. “Police districts” and “patrol beats” exemplify how
the bureaucratic structure of police departments is organized around
sub-geographical areas. It is these areas that provide narratives or
cognitive maps used by ofﬁcers to understand the nature of crime and
the citizens contained therein. Thus, space provides a context for
understanding patterns of ofﬁcer decision-making. Recent scholarship
considering police use of force has offered at least some support for
the inﬂuence of space on this discretionary behavior (Terrill & Reisig,
2003). Despite recent advances, Klinger (2004) contends the general
disregard of ecological inﬂuences has resulted in the absence of a
“systematic theory of how and why police behavior varies across
space” (p. 278).
Macro-level inﬂuences on police decision-making
Social disorganization theory provides a framework for under-
standing how social control and other forms of governmental
resources are mobilized within and between neighborhoods. Police
organizations, like other governmental entities, can be conceptualized
as social institutions with the capacity to provide a myriad of services
that increase the overall quality of communities (Kelling & Coles,
1996).4 They represent one of the most direct and immediate modes
the community has to access governmental services, particularly in
disorganized communities otherwise lacking effective social institu-
tions. It is worthwhile to understand how access to police services is
distributed between and within communities.
Police recording practices, like other forms of police behavior, can
be quantiﬁed to reﬂect levels of social control and resource allocation.
For example, the decision to translate calls into ofﬁcial crime brings
with it the infusion of potentially coercive or beneﬁcial governmental
intervention. This intervention may take the form of investigative
resources that result in arrests, use of force, detention, and/or
imprisonment. Reporting parties will typically interpret these
resources as positive infusion of governmental authority because
theywere speciﬁcally requested. Less formal responses (e.g., an ofﬁcer
reprimanding and releasing a suspect) and other undocumented
outcomes represent less social control. Police recording practices, like
other forms of police resource allocation and discretion, are expected
to be inﬂuenced by ecological characteristics of place. Prior research
has sustained that there is a spatial dimension to nearly all forms of
police behavior (Herbert, 1997; Klinger, 1997; Rubinstein, 1973). That
is, even when controlling for situational and temporal variables,
characteristics of places where crime occurs remain important to
understanding how police resources (including the responses to calls
for service) are allocated. Herbert (1997) succinctly states:
The location of the incident is also recognized as crucial, because it
may shape how ofﬁcers view situations; ofﬁcers may understand
an area to be characterized by a certain way of life that must be
taken into consideration. ….[P]olice ofﬁcers are acutely aware of
the prevailing moral order in the areas they patrol and act in
accordance more with that than with the law. (pp. 35-36)
Variation in when and how police resources are mobilized at the
neighborhood level reﬂects differential access to the public level of
systemic control (see Bursik & Grasmick, 1993). From a social
disorganization perspective, aggregate patterns of police behavior
are reﬂective of the capacity of neighborhoods to mobilize public
resources. It is expected that members of all segments of society can
mobilize the police to take formal action (e.g., respond to a call for
service, conduct an investigation, record a police report when crime
occurs, and provide other resources to apprehend offenders). Thus,
residents who contact their local police department to report a
problem are likely to expect that their victimization will be
recognized as important and that their call will be effective in
mobilizing a desired level of resource investment. From this
perspective, citizens are likely to expect formalized police action
when they request the presence of police.5 The recording of a police
report when the available evidence supports such a conclusion
represents, at a minimum, a symbolic acknowledgement that the
victimization actually occurred and the appropriate authorities are
doing something to bring justice.
Kubrin and Weitzer (2003) speciﬁcally encourage social scientists
to expand traditional conceptualizations of collective efﬁcacy to
include additional forms of social control, such as when and how
governmental agents handle community problems. Mobilizing the
police to respond to crime, for example, has largely been ignored by
the research community. Calling the police as a means of resolving
conﬂict represents the point of demarcation where informal private
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social control breaks down in favor of public control (Bursik &
Grasmick, 1993). When other forms of social control fail and public
modes are invoked, it is presumed that the police will be responsive to
crime victims regardless of neighborhood characteristics. Although
there is disagreement among scholars if calling the police represents a
type of formal or (indirect) informal social control, the process itself
“refers to practices of the authorities to maintain order and enforce
legal and regulatory codes” (Kubrin & Weitzer, 2003, p. 381).6 The
basis of the argument is that neighborhoods can be differentiated
based on their capacity to mobilize public resources into purposive
action. Thus, it is important to consider variations in this capacity and
to discern what neighborhood characteristics (consistent with social
disorganization theory) predict such variations.
Neighborhoods and police resource mobilization – prior research
Empirical evidence has established that neighborhood character-
istics inﬂuence a variety of police behaviors. Some argue there is a
positive relationship between the distribution of police resources and
social status, with economically advantaged neighborhoods receiving
the most and best quality of governmental resources. This perspective
suggests that fewer government services of all types are allocated to
poor and minority neighborhoods; per resident, less money is spent
on streets, social services, recreation, libraries, police, and ﬁre protec-
tion (Lineberry, 1977; Liska & Chamlin, 1984). Liska and Chamlin
(1984) argue government employees (including police) do not place
equivalent value on residents of these disadvantaged areas, a situa-
tion the authors refer to as “benign neglect.” Police ofﬁcersmay be less
likely to use their authority to aid victims because even serious
incidents may be viewed as “trivial” and victims as less deserving or
credible (Uviller, 1984). Less police recording would be expected in
poor and minority neighborhoods.
Residents of disadvantaged communities often report police are
less responsive to local concerns and assume relatively tolerant
approaches to crime, especially street crime (Huang & Vaughn, 1996;
Kennedy, 1997; Kubrin & Weitzer, 2003). Smith (1986) supports this
contention, ﬁnding police recording behavior is greater in higher
status neighborhoods and less likely in transient neighborhoods.
Importantly, Smith's (1986) ﬁndings suggest that neighborhood
inﬂuences are dependent on the type of police behavior considered.
That is, police exert more coercive authority in minority communities
but more assistance-like behavior in upper-income neighborhoods
withmore elderly persons. Thismay partially explainwhy residents of
these communities often view police negatively (Schafer, Huebner, &
Bynum, 2003), though empirical support for this perspective is
inconsistent (Van Ryzin, Muzzio, & Immerwahr, 2004).
A competing perspective suggests an inverse relationship between
space and police behavior; public resources (particularly those
deemed coercive) are thought to be disproportionately concentrated
in poor and minority neighborhoods. The minority group threat
hypothesis (Jackson, 1989), for example, suggests that minority
communities are over policed; police spendmore uncommitted patrol
time in minority neighborhoods and are likely to apply the law in a
more formal fashion. The threat hypothesis is a class-based perspec-
tive that predicts governmental authority is exercised in ways that
control “dangerous classes” (Blalock, 1967; Jackson, 1989). Police
authority is a manifestly coercive form of class power that is
instrumental to maintaining existing social relations. Kane (2003),
for example, reported police deployment across neighborhoods
increased as percent Latino increased, but effects were nonlinear
and decreased after a “tipping point” was reached. Terrill and Reisig
(2003) reported that police are signiﬁcantlymore likely to use force in
neighborhoods characterized by high levels of crime and concentrated
disadvantage. Residents of poor and minority neighborhoods are
viewed as a potential threat to the existing normative order, and are in
need of social control (Bass, 2001; Bayley &Mendelsohn, 1969). Police
ofﬁcers would be expected to respond more vigorously and formally,
even to minor incidents, in order to gain control over the area and its
residents. The threat hypothesis has been supported in some studies
(Jackson, 1989; Liska & Chamlin, 1984; Liska, Chamlin, & Reed, 1985;
Smith, 1986; Sung, 2002; Warner, 1997), and if it holds in the present
analysis, more recording is expected in poor and minority
neighborhoods.
Warner's (1997) ﬁndings on police recording practices in Boston
provided some support for the conﬂict perspective. These ﬁndings
indicated that neighborhood level recording practices for burglarywere
related to socio-demographic characteristics. The recording of burglar-
ies was positively associated with percent foreign-born and percent
mobility. In contrast, neighborhood poverty was negatively asso-
ciated with recording; police recorded fewer burglary calls in poorer
neighborhoods. Recording practices, however, are also conditioned
by crime type (Maxﬁeld et al., 1980; Warner, 1997). After noting that
neighborhood inﬂuences had little effect on recording of assaults
compared to burglary, Warner (1997) concluded that neighborhood
characteristics dissipate as crime seriousness increases. It is likely that
when the chance of apprehending an offender is low (e.g., burglary),
police are more likely to ignore criminal victimization.
Existing literature suggests a third possible explanation. It is
possible that police recording practices are a function of neighborhood
crime levels. The tolerance of deviance perspective posits that police
have a limited capacity to respond to reported crime in violent or
crime-ridden neighborhoods. Resources are considered to be relative-
ly ﬁxed, so as demand for ﬁnite resources increases, so does the
“threshold” at which a formal response occurs (Alpert, MacDonald, &
Dunham, 2005). In higher crime neighborhoods, police may fail to
differentiate between victims and offenders (Klinger, 1997; Stark,
1987). For example, some victims may be viewed as “unworthy”
(Uviller, 1984) of police consideration based on social class and space
(e.g., surroundings). Ofﬁcers may view certain levels and/or types of
deviance as acceptable, and thereby perceive victim/complainant as
less worthy of ofﬁcial intervention due to the reoccurring nature of
citizen request for police service.
Sampson and Jeglum-Bartusch (1998) found a signiﬁcant rela-
tionship between socioeconomic status and tolerance of deviance
among residents of Chicago neighborhoods; individuals living in more
disadvantaged neighborhoods are more tolerant of deviance. It is
possible that ofﬁcers recognize these community sentiments and
begin to accept higher levels of deviance as “normal,” which in turn,
does not warrant formal intervention. Viewed in this way, police
recording criminal behavior would be considered a function of the
overall demand for police services within a neighborhood. Conse-
quently, in “demanding” areas, overall recording would be expected
to be proportionally less common. Maxﬁeld et al. (1980) found
that work load, not demographic characteristics, best explains
neighborhood-level variation in recording practices. The research
found that variation in recording practices conditioned by crime type;
as work load increases so does variation in recording practices for less
serious crime (p. 233). As a result, it takes higher levels of criminal/
deviant behavior to generate a formal police report (see also Lawton,
2007). The tolerance of deviance perspective offers an alternative
explanation that serves to further support Warner's (1997) ﬁndings
that police recording behaviors are conditioned by crime seriousness.
Guided by the theoretical frameworks noted above, the present
study examined the effects of neighborhood characteristics on police
recording behavior. In doing so, this study complimented Warner's
(1997) work by expanding on her research in ways that: (a) broaden
the range of call types and (b) shifts the unit of analysis to a smaller
geographical aggregate. Toward this end, a central goal was to deter-
minewhether patterns of police recording behavior vary by crime type
as suggested byWarner (1997). In addition, the present study added to
the existing body of police recording scholarship by considering the
effects of land use and work load temporal characteristics.
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Methods
Research setting
The research took place in the city of San Antonio, Texas, a large
metropolitan community with a 2000 census population of over one
million residents. San Antonio has one of the largest Latino populations
in the United States (Guzman, 2001) with a population that is
approximately 60 percent Latino (primarily persons of Mexican origin)
(U.S. Census Bureau, 2002), 35 percent White, and 6 percent Black.
According to the 2000 census, only 12 percent of the Latino population
was foreign-born and 15 percent reported speaking English less
than “very well.” In other words, San Antonio is an acculturated city
characterized by large numbers of Latino native-born Mexican
American residents. Despite such acculturation, there are indications
that San Antonio's Latino neighborhoods demonstrate characteristics
consistent with social disorganization. Latino neighborhoods exhibit
higher concentrations of poor female-headed households and indivi-
duals who receive public assistance and/or are unemployed (Martinez,
Stowell, & Cancino, 2008). Allen and Turner (2005) reported 78 percent
of the Latino population is concentrated in certain residential areas. To
gain a better sense of community factors that may inﬂuence police
decision-making, San Antonio's 275 census tracts were selected as the
unit of analysis.
Researchers have long considered the appropriate operational
deﬁnition for neighborhood boundaries in recent years. Sampson and
Jeglum-Bartusch (1998), for example, created “neighborhood clusters”
of census tracts based on natural boundaries demarcating areas.Warner
and Pierce (1993) operationalized “neighborhoods” as long recognized
boundaries in Boston, a city with well-established and recognized
neighborhoods. In contrast, researchers considering the effects of neigh-
borhood characteristics on police practices have often deﬁned neigh-
borhoods based on police administrative boundaries such as precincts
(Kane, 2006) or team areas (Schafer et al., 2003). Finally, researchers
have also used conventional administrative boundaries such as census
tracts or similar administrative boundaries (Cancino, Varano, Schafer,
& Enriquez, 2007; Warner, 1997; Wooldredge, 2002). The choice of
deﬁnition is not merely an issue of semantics, but may have important
implications for the substantive meaning of research ﬁndings. The
concept of modiﬁable area unit problem (MAUP), for example, suggests
the choice of aggregate boundariesmight be artiﬁcial and not reﬂect any
underlying meaning. If this is the case, research ﬁndings could be
misleading (Unwin, 1996).
The choice of census tracts in the current research as an opera-
tional deﬁnition for neighborhoods was justiﬁed for the following
reasons. While this deﬁnition is not without controversy, the criminal
justice/criminology community has generally accepted it as an
appropriate measure. Moreover, San Antonio is a community that
has undergone substantial periods of geographical growth in recent
decades through annexation that make more natural boundaries
nearly impossible to deﬁne. A city of approximately 37 squaremiles in
1937, the geographical boundaries of San Antonio increased to
approximately 70 square miles in the 1940s, more than 160 miles
in the 1950s, and included more than 522 square miles in 2006 (City
of San Antonio, 2008). Thus, San Antonio is an ever expanding
community both in terms of geography and population. In contrast
with more historic cities with long established neighborhood
boundaries (e.g., Boston, Detroit, or Chicago), San Antonio is an ever
changing city. Based on discussions with the San Antonio Police
Department's research and planning unit, the city's growth makes it
difﬁcult to preserve the “natural” boundaries/patterns. It should also
be noted thatWooldredge (2002) reported little effects of aggregation
bias when utilizing census tracts versus more generally recognized
neighborhood boundaries. As a result, although acknowledging the
possibility MAUP, it was decided to proceed with the census tracts as
a proxy for neighborhoods.
Dependent variables
Police recording practices were operationalized using two data
ﬁles, calls for service and ofﬁcial crime incident data, both of which
were provided by the San Antonio Police Department (SAPD). Calls for
service (CFS) data provided details of each call received by the SAPD
andwere themost complete source of emergency calls. Not included in
this analysis were apparent crimes that might come to the attention of
police in ways other than 911, such as walk-in reports to police
substations. In their analysis of discrepancies between dispatched calls
for service and actual police encounters observed by researchers,
Klinger and Bridges (1997) reported that call data might under-
represent actual crime levels. Klinger and Bridges' (1997) research,
however, emanated from an observational study of policing in 1977, a
timewhen communication technologywas quite different. The impact
of excluding reports made through sources other than 911 was
unknown at this time. The SAPD receives, on average, between
850,000 and 950,000 CFS annually.7 The data were pooled across ﬁve
years covering the period 2001-2005. This increased the overall
sample size in each neighborhood. SAPD's data system purged
multiple calls relating to the same event.8 The records included call
identiﬁcation number, initial dispatch classiﬁcation type, and dispatch
location. Each call was geocoded and assigned to the appropriate
census tract with ArcView 9.0, a leading GIS software (x-y coordinates
were included in the CFS data). After the CFS data was geocoded to
their respective neighborhoods, ofﬁcial crime incident data were
utilized to complete the operationalization of the dependent variables.
The ofﬁcial crime incident data represented all founded crimes that
were used to tabulate ofﬁcial crime measures. The records included
case number, address location, date and time, and crime type. More
importantly, the CFS and ofﬁcial crime incident data were subse-
quently merged through a common identiﬁer included in both ﬁles.
Merging of the ﬁles based on this unique identiﬁer was a novel
operational strategy not found in existing literature.
Separate dependent variables were computed for each of nine
different call for service categories: assaultive violence (including
domestic assault), auto theft/burglary of auto, residential/commercial
burglary, drugs and vice, sexual assault, robbery (personal and
commercial grouped),9 weapon-carrying offenses (e.g., carrying
concealed weapons), disturbances, and minor property crime. The
call categories represent classiﬁcations assigned to calls by dispatchers
and eventually recorded in SAPD's call for service data base. Calls for
service were determined to be “translated” if they appeared in the
crime incident data as recorded crime events.10 Neighborhood rates
were then calculated by dividing the number of translated CFS by the
total number of CFS for each category. The city of San Antonio was
comprised of 275 census tracts at the time of the 2000 census. For each
dependent variable, the analysis was restricted to tracts with counts of
ﬁve or more CFS to avoid possible biasing effects of translation rates
based on smaller numbers of incidents.11
The descriptive statistics for the dependent variables are pre-
sented in Table 1. The data indicated there were substantial variations
in police recording behavior across crime types with higher rates for
more serious crimes. For example, the translation rate for robbery
was 65 percent compared to 59 percent for auto theft, 41 percent for
rape/sexual assault, 35 percent for assaultive crimes, 33 percent for
other weapon offenses, and 28 percent for drugs/vice crime. The
lowest translation rates, between 5 and 6 percent, were associated
with disturbances and minor property crimes. The data were
informative and suggested that translation rates vary considerably
by crime type.
Independent variables
The ﬁrst set of independent variables was informed by the
ecology of crime literature and represented traditional measures of
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social disorganization theory. They included dimensions of social
disorganization that had previously been shown to predict
neighborhood crime levels (Bursik & Grasmick, 1993; Sampson &
Jeglum-Bartusch, 1998), neighborhood levels of police use of force
(Terrill & Reisig, 2003), and police resource allocation (Kane, 2003).
The variables were derived from the 2000 U.S. Census Bureau and
are freely available through on-line data sets (www.census.gov).
The variables included total population (transformed by dividing
population by 100), percent Black population, percent Latino
population,12 residential mobility (percent of residents living in
their current residence less than ﬁve years), percent female-headed
households with children, percent poverty (percent of households
living in poverty), percent foreign born, and percent owner-
occupied housing. An additional variable, percent linguistically
isolated, represented circumstances in which no household mem-
ber fourteen years or older spoke: (1) only English, or (2) a
language other than English, but also spoke English “very well.”
Linguistic isolation was included due to San Antonio's large Latino
Spanish-speaking community.
Three additional neighborhood variables were included. Average
yearly calls for service received was included as a work load measure
in order to account for the tolerance of deviance perspective, which
suggests that police will be less responsive to victimizations
that occur in higher crime neighborhoods. Percent commercial land
(land parcels classiﬁed as commercial use) and percent CFS received
on Fridays and Saturdays,13 were also included. The data for “percent
commercial” were a “land use and valuation” ﬁle provided by the
Bexar County Tax Assessors Ofﬁce in San Antonio. This variable was
included because recent research on neighborhoods and crime
suggests that features of land use often shape people's perceptions
of and responses to crime (McCord, Ratcliffe, Garcia, & Taylor, 2007).
Percent CFS on Fridays and Saturdays also accounts for temporal
characteristics of police work load. These two variables considered
simultaneously account for problems associated with entertainment
and other commercial establishments which may inﬂuence other
decision-making. Descriptive statistics for all independent variables
are also included in Table 1.
Hypotheses
Based on the literature, the following hypothesized relationships
were proposed:
Hypothesis 1. There will be a negative relationship between social
disorganization and recordingpractices. Residents of disorganizedneigh-
borhoods would be expected to have a reduced capacity to mobilize
public goods and police would thereby be more inclined to ignore
victimizations.
Hypothesis 2. There will be a positive relationship between percent
commercial parcels (land use) and percent CFS occurring on Friday/
Saturdays. Both measures are proxy measures for economic interests.
Police are expected to respond in ways that protect economic
interests; more recording is expected.
Hypothesis 3. There is a negative relationship between work load
and recording practices. The “tolerance of deviance” perspective sug-
gests that as work load increases, police “load shed” by ignoring
apparent crimes.
Analysis
Bivariate correlations between the independent and dependent
variables are presented in Table 2. Several important ﬁndings emerged
from this initial analysis. The bivariate relationships between the inde-
pendent variables and police recording behaviors varied by crime type.
For less serious crime, such as minor property crimes and disturbances,
only a few of the relationships were signiﬁcant. Thus, neighborhood
characteristics appeared to explain little variation in police recording
practices for less serious crime. Theseﬁndings stood in sharp contrast to
Table 1
CFS translation rates for census tracts (n=275)
CFS descriptives Translation descriptives
Valid tractsa Min Max Mean S.D. Mean rate S.D.
Dependent variables
Assaultive crime 261 5 8,337 675 709 0.35 0.09
Auto theft 250 6 1,361 190 141 0.59 0.07
Burglary 255 6 4,501 1,034 1,034 0.61 0.07
Disturbances 262 9 26,821 3,667 3,667 0.05 0.02
Drugs/vice 251 5 2,405 252 252 0.28 0.11
Minor property crime 260 5 10,172 936 936 0.06 0.03
Rape/sexual assault 248 5 2,764 98 98 0.41 0.11
Robbery 241 5 617 53 53 0.65 0.10
Other weapon offenses 229 5 278 39 39 0.33 0.12
Independent variables All tracts Min Max Mean S.D.
Populationb 275 13 12,562 5,025 2,238
Percent Black 275 0.00 0.73 0.07 0.11
Percent Latino 275 0.00 0.98 0.55 0.27
Population mobility 275 0.00 0.96 0.49 0.15
Percent female-headed households
with children
275 0.00 0.35 0.09 0.05
Percent poverty 275 0.00 0.61 0.16 0.12
Percent foreign born 275 0.00 0.36 0.11 0.06
Percent linguistic isolation 275 0.00 0.52 0.09 0.08
Percent owner occupied 275 0.01 0.98 0.61 0.22
CFS yearly average 2001-2005 275 0.00 29,786 3,170 2,548
Percent parcels commercial 275 0.00 1.00 0.06 0.11
Percent CFS Friday and Saturday 275 0.17 0.50 0.31 0.02
a Analysis for dependent variables restricted to tracts of ﬁve or more calls for service.
b Variable was transformed by dividing total population by 100. The purpose was to reduce the variance.
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the results for serious crimes. For assaultive incidents, percent Latino,
female-headed households with children, owner occupied housing,
foreign born, and linguistic isolation were signiﬁcantly related to police
recorded behaviors. Most of the relationships were in the negative
direction which suggested police translate fewer assaultive calls in
neighborhoods characterized by disorganization and recent immi-
grants. Similar relationships were observed for burglary and robbery. In
the only instance where CFS work load was signiﬁcant (minor property
crime), it was in the negative direction. Finally, in the models where
percent land parcels commercial or percent calls received on Fridays
and Saturdays were signiﬁcant, they were mostly in the positive
direction. This indicated police may respond more formally to crime
that occurs in commercial areas and neighborhoods with more week-
end crime.
To further explore these relationships, nine separate multivariate
models were constructed to analyze the relationships between the
independent and dependent variables. Ordinary-least squares (OLS)
regression would normally be used to analyze these relationships
since the outcomemeasures are continuous. An important assumption
of OLS regression, however, is that each observation is independent of
all others. Given the spatial nature of the data, this assumption was
likely violated. Spatial dependency, a concern traditionally referred to
as spatial autocorrelation, implies that any given geographical unit's
value is dependent on surrounding areas. This type of spatial de-
pendency violates OLS assumptions of independent errors and could
lead to inefﬁcient and/or biased coefﬁcients (Levine, 1996). To account
for dependence among observations, a spatially-lagged error model
(see Anselin, 1988) was used in all multivariate analyses.14 Spatial
weights were computed using Queen's contiguity. The weights and
subsequent regression analyses were computed using GeoDa 0.9.5i, a
freeware statistical software package, provided by the Spatial Analysis
Laboratory in the Department of Agricultural and Consumer Econom-
ics at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign (https://www.
geoda.uiuc.edu/).
The multivariate ﬁndings for the ﬁrst categories of calls for service,
assaultive crimes, are presented in Model 1 (see, Table 3).15 Results
for this model indicated that approximately 24 percent of the
variation in police recording practices for assaultive crimes was ex-
plained by the variables. With a few exceptions, the majority of social
disorganization variables were not signiﬁcant predictors of recording
behaviors for aggravated assault. Although percent Black and Latino
were negatively associated with translation rate, neither achieved
statistical signiﬁcance. Percent owner occupied was the only social
disorganization variable signiﬁcantly and positively related to
translation rates for assaultive crimes. This indicated police respond
more formally to assaults in neighborhoods characterized by greater
proportion of owner occupied units. Land use, as measured by percent
commercial parcels, was also signiﬁcantly and positively associated
with recording behavior. Finally, the variable measuring percent calls
occurring on Friday and Saturdays was also signiﬁcant and positive.16
Model 2 details the ﬁndings for CFS that originated as auto thefts.
In contrast to Model 1, the overall explained variance was substan-
tially lower (24 percent compared to 15 percent). The relationship
between percent Black was signiﬁcant and negative, although
nonsigniﬁcant for percent Latino. Two additional social disorganiza-
tion measures, percent households in poverty and percent owner
occupied housing were both also signiﬁcant predictors of recording
behaviors and in the negative direction. Finally, average yearly work
load (CFS yearly average) was signiﬁcant and positively associated
with recording behavior.
The ﬁndings for burglary are presented in Model 3. Compared to
Models 1 and 2, the explained variance in Model 3 was considerably
larger (47 percent) suggesting a better ﬁt. Three of the social dis-
organization variables, percent Black, percent foreign-born, and percent
linguistic isolation, were signiﬁcantly related to recording behavior and
in the negative direction. This indicated that ofﬁcers recorded fewer
burglary calls in poorer neighborhoods with higher percentages of
recent immigrants. Like Model 2, average yearly CFS was also positively
associated with recording behaviors.
Models 4, 5, and 6 detail the ﬁndings for disturbances, drugs/vice,
and minor property crime. These call types represented events that are
among the least serious andmost ambiguous that police encounter. The
R-squared values ranged from 9 percent for disturbance calls to 15
percent and 25 percent for minor property crime and drugs/vice calls,
respectively. For disturbance calls, the only signiﬁcant predictors asso-
ciated with social disorganization theory were percent owner occupied
and percent Latino residents. Police recorded a signiﬁcantly higher
proportion of calls in neighborhoods with more Latinos and renters.
Moreover, there was a signiﬁcant but negative relationship between
average yearly CFS work load and recording behaviors. The ﬁndings for
drugs/vice and minor property crime were very different than distur-
bances. For drugs/vice calls, percent mobility, percent owner occupied,
and percent CFS Friday and Saturday were signiﬁcantly and negatively
associated with recording behaviors. Percent commercial was also
signiﬁcant but in the positive direction. It appeared that police recorded
a larger proportion of calls for drugs/vice in neighborhoods with more
commercial parcels compared to other areas.
The ﬁndings for rape/sexual assault are detailed in Model 7. The
model accounted for 17 percent of the explained variance. Interestingly,
the single biggest predictor (in terms of magnitude of coefﬁcient) of
translation rate was the percent of female-headed households with
children. Total population and yearly CFSwork loadwere also signiﬁcant
predictors in the positive direction. Model 8 included the ﬁndings for
robbery-related calls for service. The ﬁndings indicated the combined
independent variables had less explanatory power than in othermodels;
none of the independent variables reached statistical signiﬁcance except
Table 2
Bivariate correlations of police recording practices
Assaultive Auto theft Burglary Disturbance Drugs/vice Minor property Rape Robbery Other weapon
Population 0.14⁎ 0.08 0.01 -0.00 -0.19⁎⁎ -0.03 0.19⁎⁎ 0.07 -0.12
Percent Black -0.03 -0.22⁎⁎ -0.20⁎⁎ -0.03 -0.09 -0.11 0.13⁎ -0.08 0.10
Percent Latino -0.31⁎⁎ -0.16 -0.37⁎⁎ 0.16⁎⁎ 0.20⁎⁎ -0.02 -0.24⁎⁎ -0.25⁎⁎ 0.33⁎⁎
Population mobility 0.10 0.00 0.29⁎⁎ -0.05 -0.14⁎ -0.10 0.21⁎⁎ 0.22⁎⁎ -0.24⁎⁎
Percent female-headed households with children -0.14⁎ -0.12 -0.37⁎⁎ 0.18⁎⁎ 0.03 -0.08 0.06 -0.14⁎ 0.19⁎⁎
Percent poverty -0.31⁎⁎ -0.21⁎⁎ -0.45⁎⁎ 0.06 0.24⁎⁎ -0.03 -0.21⁎⁎ -0.29⁎⁎ 0.41⁎⁎
Percent owner occupied 0.17⁎⁎ -0.08 -0.01 -0.06 -0.20⁎⁎ 0.13⁎ -0.03 -0.09 -0.12
Percent foreign born -0.27⁎⁎ -0.09 -0.30⁎⁎ 0.02 0.20⁎⁎ -0.05 -0.26⁎⁎ -0.18⁎⁎ 0.31⁎⁎
Linguistic isolation -0.30⁎⁎ -0.09 -0.32⁎⁎ 0.06 0.20 -0.00 -0.25⁎⁎ -0.25⁎⁎ 0.37⁎⁎
CFS yearly average 0.02 0.01 0.03 -0.04 0.09 -0.15⁎⁎ -0.06 -0.21 0.13
Percent parcels commercial 0.16⁎⁎ 0.01 0.06 -0.10 0.31⁎⁎ 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.17⁎
Percent CFS Friday and Saturday 0.09 0.04 0.14⁎ -0.00 -0.05 0.27⁎ -0.16⁎⁎ -0.04 0.07
aAnalyses for dependent variables restricted to tracts with ﬁve or more calls for service.
⁎ Sig.<.05.
⁎⁎ Sig.< .01.
⁎⁎⁎ Sig.<.001.
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Table 3
Spatial error regression on translation rates
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Assault Auto theft Burglary
b SE b SE b SE b SE b SE b SE
Constant 0.158 (0.12) -0.048 (0.13) 0.536⁎ (0.14) 0.797⁎ (0.16) 0.622⁎ (0.11)
Percent commercial parcels 0.137⁎ (0.05) 0.240⁎ (0.05) 0.000 (0.00) 0.007 (0.05) 0.023 (0.03) -0.053 (0.04)
CFS yearly average 0.000 (0.00) 0.000 (0.00) 0.000 (0.00) 0.000⁎ (0.00) 0.000 (0.00) 0.000⁎ (0.00)
Percent CFS Fri. and Sat. 0.582⁎ (0.38) 0.884⁎ (0.05) 0.111 (0.45) -0.319 (0.46) 0.301 (0.31) 0.237 (0.31)
Population 0.001⁎ (0.00) -0.000 (0.00) -0.000 (0.00)
Percent Black -0.098 (0.06) -0.131⁎ (0.05) -0.129⁎ (0.05)
Percent Latino -0.072 (0.04) 0.020 (0.04) -0.057 (0.03)
Population mobility 0.063 (0.05) -0.079 (0.05) 0.046 (0.04)
Percent female-headed households with children 0.268 (0.16) 0.016 (0.14) -0.136 (0.03)
Percent poverty 0.015 (0.09) -0.268⁎ (0.08) -0.185⁎ (0.07)
Percent foreign born 0.010 (0.13) -0.145 (0.12) -0.193⁎ (0.10)
Linguistic isolation -0.171 (0.12) 0.074 (0.11) 0.100 (0.09)
Percent owner occupied 0.120⁎ (0.03) -0.065⁎ (0.03) -0.033 (0.04)
Lambda 0.302 0.09 0.000 (0.11) 0.246⁎ 0.10 0.091 (0.11) 0.706⁎ 0.06 0.514⁎ (0.08)
Model statistics
df 257 248 246 237 251 242
-2 log likelihood 277.297 304.117 308.254 324.529 354.640 379.421
R-squared 0.084 .244 0.045 .154 0.392 .470
Variable Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Disturbance Drug/vice Minor property
b SE b SE b SE b SE b SE b SE
Constant 0.066⁎ (0.03) 0.062 (0.04) 0.570 (0.17)⁎ 0.983⁎ (0.20) -0.144⁎ (0.04) -0.189⁎ (0.05)
Percent commercial parcels -0.022 (0.01) -0.021 (0.01) 0.391 (0.07)⁎ 0.359⁎ (0.08) 0.001 (0.02) 0.025 (0.02)
CFS yearly average -0.000 (0.00) -0.000⁎ (0.00) 0.000 (0.00) 0.000 (0.00) -0.000 (0.00) -0.000⁎ (0.00)
Percent CFS Fri. and Sat. -0.032 (0.10) 0.022 (0.11) -1.001 (0.55) -1.604⁎ (0.57) 0.690⁎ (0.14) 0.766⁎ (0.15)
Population 0.000 (0.00) -0.000 (0.00) 0.000 (0.00)
Percent Black -0.004 (0.02) -0.141 (0.08) -0.028 (0.02)
Percent Latino 0.022⁎ (0.01) -0.001 (0.06) -0.009 (0.01)
Population mobility -0.009 (0.01) -0.248⁎ (0.07) -0.000 (0.02)
Percent female-headed households with children 0.072 (0.04) -0.374 (0.21) 0.050 (0.06)
Percent poverty -0.037 (0.03) 0.203 (0.12) 0.053 (0.03)
Percent foreign born -0.044 (0.04) 0.109 (0.18) -0.021 (0.05)
Linguistic isolation 0.009 (0.03) -0.272 (0.16) -0.027 (0.04)
Percent owner occupied -0.024⁎ (0.01) -0.100⁎ (0.05) 0.018 (0.01)
Lambda 0.199 (0.10)⁎ 0.011 (0.11) 0.407⁎ (0.08) 0.144 (0.10) -0.021 (0.11)
Model statistics
df 258 249 247 238 256 247
-2 log likelihood 631.964 641.669 218.192 228.008 554.908 560.640
R-squared 0.029 .092 0.212 .249 0.114 .152
Variable Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
Rape Robbery Weapon
b SE b SE b SE b SE b SE b SE
Constant 0.812⁎ (0.21) 0.493⁎ (0.24) 0.687⁎ (0.22) 0.831⁎ (0.24) 0.259 (0.25) 0.234 (0.26)
Percent commercial parcels 0.012 (0.07) 0.031 (0.08) 0.030 (0.09) 0.016 (0.10) 0.143 (0.09) 0.158 (0.10)
CFS yearly average -0.000 (0.00) -0.000⁎ (0.00) -0.000 (0.00) -0.000 (0.00) 0.000 (0.00) -0.000 (0.00)
Percent CFS Fri. and Sat. -1.253 (0.68) -0.370 (0.69) -0.067 (0.70) -0.150 (0.71) 0.132 (0.78) 0.234 (0.78)
Population 0.001⁎ (0.00) -0.000 (0.00) 0.000 (0.00)
Percent Black 0.071 (0.08) -0.119 (0.08) 0.226⁎ (0.09)
Percent Latino -0.041 (0.06) -0.040 (0.05) 0.076 (0.06)
Population mobility 0.071 (0.07) 0.012 (0.07) -0.115 (0.08)
Percent female-headed households with children 0.493⁎ (0.21) 0.090 (0.20) -0.180 (0.22)
Percent poverty -0.128 (0.12) -0.188 (0.12) 0.122 (0.13)
Percent foreign born -0.221 (0.18) -0.061 (0.18) 0.052 (0.19)
Linguistic isolation 0.136 (0.16) -0.053 (0.16) 0.150 (0.17)
Percent owner occupied -0.043 (0.05) -0.109⁎ (0.05) -0.047 (0.05)
Lambda 0.271⁎ (0.10)⁎ 0.133 (0.10) 0.230⁎ (0.09) -0.056 (0.11) 0.399 (0.09) 0.073 (0.11)
Model statistics
df 244 235 237 228 225 216
-2 log likelihood 204.678 221.340 207.358 220.940 181.793 197.725
R-squared 0.061 .171 0.039 .134 0.138 .227
⁎p<.05.
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for percent commercial parcels. It was also important to note that the
explained variance (13 percent) was considerably lower for the robbery
model when compared to crimes such as burglary.
The ﬁnal model, weapon-related crimes, was detailed in Model 9.
Percent Black was the only signiﬁcant predictor of recording behavior
for weapon offenses, and it was in the positive direction. This ﬁnding
suggested that each unit increase in percent Black corresponded with a
23 percent increase in police recording for weapon-related offenses.
Interestingly, a similar relationshipwas not observed for percent Latino.
Looking across the models and within substantive groupings/
categories of independent variables, several important ﬁndings
emerged from the analyses presented above. The ﬁndings presented
some limited support for the ﬁrst hypothesis, namely, that measures
of social disorganization would be negatively associated with police
recording practices. Police translated small percentages of reported
crimes in census tracts with higher levels of poverty, African
Americans, and foreign-born individuals. In addition, police also
translated smaller proportions of calls in tracts with higher percen-
tages of population turnover (mobility). This was particularly the case
for crimes involving direct economic losses (e.g., auto theft and
burglary). The ﬁndings also provided support for the second hypo-
thesis. In tractswithhigher proportionsof commercial properties, police
translated higher percentages of both assaults and drug/vice events.
Finally, there was limited support for hypothesis that anticipated issues
of policework loadwould negatively impact translation rates. Themost
substantiveﬁndings emerged as it related to busyweekend shifts. Police
translated a larger percentage of assaults in tracts with busier weekend
shifts, but signiﬁcantly fewer drug/vice events in similar shifts. Thus, the
degree to which questions of work load impact police decision-making
may be speciﬁc to offense type.
Discussion
Why does police recording behavior matter? Understanding how
police respond to reported crime is a critical area of inquiry because
their responses represent themost direct and immediate access to the
coercive or liberating power, depending on one's perspective, of
public social control. Viewed practically, recording matters because
police hold a tremendous and largely hidden capacity in the crime
construction process that ultimately yields the “picture of crime”
across the city landscape. Theoretically, differential recording prac-
tices suggest access to the formal justice system is distributed in
different manners. The current study sought to advance the existing
scholarship by: (a) expanding the analysis to a broader cross-section
of crime/disorder types and (b) choosing a more homogenous unit
of analysis (neighborhood census tracts) not found in prior police
recording studies.
Calls for service are particularly interesting because they represent
one area of police-citizen interaction where their presence and
services are requested by the public in contrast to trafﬁc-related or
police-initiated encounters. Police responses are meaningful because
they are a direct measure of citizen access to governmental services.
Given the “gatekeeper” function of the police, the decision to report
can inﬂuence access to government and social services beyond the
criminal justice system. In his recent book, Tom Tyler (2006) explores
questions about what people really want or expect from legal
authorities. Tyler suggests that from the distributive fairness perspec-
tive, the public expects the government to distribute beneﬁts and
burdens in a fair and just manner (p. 73). It is the perceived equity of
treatment that structures much of what the public thinks about the
police and other governmental agents.
Tyler (2006) suggests that while citizens' expectations are driven
by instrumental purposes, there is also something more profound at
play. Why, for example, would someone call the police to report a
burglary when most people know there is little chance that the actual
property will be recovered (p. 72)? Beyond the instrumental purpose,
it is likely that parties report apparent victimizations to validate the
harm they have incurred and to receive some form of ofﬁcial recog-
nition of that harm. The idea of procedural justice suggests that police
and other criminal justice agencies deliver resources in a fair and
equitable manner, in a manner that both recognizes harm and at-
tempts to ameliorate it by attempting to make victims whole.
The current research evaluated the extent to which neighborhood
characteristics affect the distribution of justice. Klinger (2004) argues
that in addition to organizational context, neighborhood is an often
overlooked factor when understanding police action. It is important,
Klinger (2004) argues, to understand how “environmental forces
penetrate and inﬂuence law enforcement agencies” (p. 120). There is
sufﬁcient evidence that neighborhood characteristics inﬂuence a host of
discretionary decisions made by police on a day-to-day basis. The
empirical evidence has shown that neighborhood characteristics indeed
dictate how police respond to crime, but neighborhood inﬂuences vary
by crime type. Looking across models, the explained variances range
widely from 9 percent for disturbance calls to 47 percent for burglary.
Unsurprisingly, a smaller fraction of CFS for minor crimes such as
disturbances and minor property crimes are translated as “ofﬁcial
crimes.” It is interesting to note that for disturbance calls, police record a
smaller percentage of calls in areaswith higher levels of owner occupied
housing, and by extension, take more formal actions in neighborhoods
with higher levels of vacant or rental housing units. Similarly, police
respond more formally to disturbance calls in neighborhoods with
higher levels of Latinos. It could be worthwhile to further explore how
recorded CFS categories such as “disturbance” are either upgraded or
downgradedwhen translated. It could be that in some neighborhoods, a
greater percentage of “disturbance” calls might actually bemore serious
crimes such as domestic violence. This supposition, while curious, is
likely not the case. First, no such relationships exist aswould be expected
in the assault analysis presented in Model 1. Moreover, Ammar, Orloff,
Dutton, andAguilar-Hass (2005) provide evidence thatpolice often view
domestic violence victimizations among Latinas less seriously.
For more serious forms of property crime such as auto theft and
burglary, neighborhood inﬂuences matter to a much greater degree. It
is interesting to note that for burglary, race, and social disorganization
variables appear to impact recording decisions negatively. Why? The
“unworthy victim” perspective (Uviller, 1984) suggests ofﬁcers fail to
take action because victims in poorer neighborhoods are deemed less
worthy of ofﬁcial action. Warner (1997) argues, especially for serious
property crime, when the likelihood of suspect apprehension is low
(e.g., burglary) police record fewer events in poor-minority areas.
These decisions, however, may be more practical in nature since
residents of poor neighborhoods may be less likely to maintain
appropriate insurance policies that will replace stolen or damaged
goods.Where an insurance claim is likely, police will generate reports.
Knowing that burglaries are rarely solved and property seldom
recovered, ofﬁcers and citizens may be less inclined to “waste time”
documenting a burglary when the victim is uninsured. It is more likely
that reality is somewhere between the two explanations as most of
the other independent variables were also in the negative direction
even when controlling for poverty.
The lack of neighborhood effects for robbery was expected. Robbery
is a serious crime bymost standards and generally has fewer ambiguous
circumstances compared to other forms of assaultive behavior. Nearly
two-thirds of all robberies were translated as ofﬁcial crime. It is likely
that situational factors greatly inﬂuence ofﬁcer recording behavior for
robbery. Two variables that emerged as important predictors of re-
cording behavior, and were often absent in prior research, are percent
commercial parcels and percent CFS on weekends (Friday and
Saturdays). These variables measure both land use and temporal
characteristics of crime. For both assaultive and drug/vice crimes, the
relationships for both variables were signiﬁcantly positive. San Antonio
has awell known entertainment district commonly knownas the “River
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Walk.”Ofﬁcersworking along theRiverWalkmay responddifferentially
to crimes due to tourist safety; and the fact that this popular area
generates of large portion of city revenue. In addition, the formal
application of the law around known problem locations in entertain-
ment districts may very well function as a “code enforcement” strategy.
For example, San Antonio recently adopted a city ordinance to more
strictly regulate adult entertainment establishments based on the
“secondary effects” premise (Enriquez, Cancino, & Varano, 2006). It is
possible that cities may rely on formal and aggressive recording
practices in order to build a legal position against establishments (e.g.,
bars and clubs) that appear to be associated with social problems and
crime.
Considering the race and ethnicity variables across the models,
police generally translate a small proportion of crimes in Latino and
Black neighborhoods suggesting that victimizations are more often
ignored. One exception to this rule is the effect of percent Black on
recording for weapon-related offenses. As described earlier, this
category is largely comprised of weapon-carrying behaviors. The
relationship for percent Black was signiﬁcant and positive, the only
signiﬁcant variable in the model. This difference might be explained
by either differential enforcement practices, or more likely, different
types of weapons. There is evidence that supports this argument;
compared to both Whites and Latinos, African Americans are more
likely to carry, brandish, and use ﬁrearms (Nielsen, Martinez, &
Rosenfeld, 2005). Additional empirical evidence suggests that
neighborhoods with larger concentrations of Latinos are less violent,
in terms of homicide, than their racial/ethic counterparts (Martinez,
2002; Martinez & Lee, 2000).
Amore compelling and controversial explanation for the positively
signiﬁcant association between percent Black and weapon transla-
tions is based on implicit bias (Banaji, 2002), racial stigma and cultural
stereotypes (Loury, 2002), and ecological contamination (Werthman
& Piliavin, 1967). These theoretical perspectives are related, in that
they operate at the individual level, yet have implications ecologically.
For example, the implicit bias thesis posits that an individual
automatically concludes (despite empirical contrary evidence) from
a statistical generalization that a Black neighborhood has a particular
problem with crime and violence. Such implicit bias leads to actual
perceptions of racial stigma and ecological contamination whereby
individuals view all persons (e.g., Blacks) living in a geographical area
as threatening, dangerous, and violent (e.g., culture of violence). In a
recent experimental study with police ofﬁcers, Correl, Park, Judd, and
Wittenbrink (2002) tested the power of implicit bias by conducting
shoot/don't shoot exercises with police ofﬁcers who were instructed
to shoot armed and not to shoot unarmed targets. The ﬁndings
indicated that ofﬁcers responded more quickly to shooting an armed
target when such target represented an African American as opposed
to a White target. Although San Antonio is a majority-minority city,
African Americans are a racial and cultural minority.
The current study added to existing literature by includingmeasures
of foreign-born and linguistic isolation, two distinct dimensions of im-
migration. It was noteworthy that with the exception of burglary,
neither percent foreign-born nor linguistic isolation were signiﬁcant
predictors of police recording behaviors. These ﬁndings contrasted
Warner's (1997) signiﬁcant foreign-born effect. The majority of
minorities in San Antonio are Latinos of Mexican Heritage. In addition,
nearly 50percentof the SanAntonio PoliceDepartment is Latino (http://
www.sanantonio.gov/sapd/InfoPersonnel.asp). The assumption is that
Latino citizens and police share a cultural background that provides a
level of responsiveness to the needs of Latino neighborhoods.
The ﬁndings for the work load variable (average yearly CFS total)
were somewhat mixed. With the exception of rape/sexual assault,
work load was a signiﬁcant predictor of recording behaviors only in
the property crimemodels. For more serious property crimes like auto
theft and burglary, the relationships betweenwork load and recording
were positive and signiﬁcant. In contrast, work load was a signiﬁcant,
negative predictor of recording for minor property crime. The effects
of work load then are mitigated by crime seriousness.
Overall, results added to the social disorganization literature in a few
important ways. Bursik and Grasmick (1993) recognized that neigh-
borhood social control is exercised through a variety of social insti-
tutions that play important roles in establishing norms of conduct and
responses to violations of such conduct. For example, schools, com-
munity centers, families, and governmental services are likely to set the
foundation for appropriate/inappropriate behavior. All else being equal,
strong pro-social neighborhoods produce strong social institutions.
Social control, however, is exercised through different outlets. Private
level social control is controlwhich is exercised through informal social/
friendship networks (Bursik & Grasmick, 1993, pp. 16-18). Numerous
scholars have attempted to explain the factors that explain the decisions
of individuals to take ownership of local problems. To be sure, much of
the collective efﬁcacy literature seeks to explain how private social
control is mobilizing between and within communities. Parochial
control is different, in that it conceptualizes social control as a
mechanismoperating through social institutions such as stores, schools,
and churches. Finally, public control is a form of social control that is
exercised through neighborhood capacity to secure and realize public
goods. More precisely, a neighborhood's capacity for public control
refers to its capacity tomobilize and secure desirablemunicipal services
that are traditionally located outside of the neighborhood.
Findings from the current research underscored the relationship
between neighborhood characteristics and access to public goods.
That is, police recording behavior can be conceptualized in a way that
reﬂects differential access to public goods; more formal recording
behavior equates to greater access to desirable or beneﬁcial public
service. These ﬁndings suggested that neighborhoods which experi-
ence higher levels of social disorganization experience reduced access
to public control. Features of social disorganization seem tomatter the
most when the chances of actually apprehending a suspect is at its
lowest (e.g., burglary). This supported Warner's (1997) ﬁnding that
police recording behaviors decrease as the chances of apprehension
decreased. In this context, these ﬁndings provided some limited
support for the conclusion that police respond less formally to
victimizations that happen in disorganized neighborhoods even after
controlling for work load. It is important to note, however, that this
conclusion is likely crime-speciﬁc. For example, robbery is a serious
personal crime that involves strangers, some level of direct victim and
offender interaction, and often involves physical harm.
The inclusion of land use and temporal measures of crime added
an additional dimension to the police recording body of research.
Namely, these ﬁndings indicated that police and other governmental
agents might be sensitive to the economic interests that exist in and
around commercial/entertainment districts; the result may be more
responsive policing (i.e., higher rates of translation). As stated earlier,
San Antonio has a well deﬁned entertainment district that is critical to
its economic viability and tourist industry. There is likely pressure on
police to be responsive to crime that occurs in these areas. It is not
surprising that police respond to assaultive crimes and drugs/vice
more formally since they are among themost visible forms of disorder
and can threaten the viability of an entertainment district.
Conclusion
Researchers are encouraged to explore how discretion is exercised
across awide range of police behaviors. Since discretion lies at the very
core of policing, it is important to understand if access to public control
is governed by discriminatory practices. Police are in many ways the
gatekeepers to the formal criminal justice system, and as Tyler (2006)
argues, such access should be based on fundamental fairness. Criminal
victimization, regardless of the level of perceived damage, is harmful
and should be recognized formally. The decision of individual police
ofﬁcers to record reported behavior as “ofﬁcial crime” is one important
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symbolic step in acknowledging its impact and communicating that
the victimization is important to the collective community.
Scholars are encouraged to build on this work by expanding
analyses to include both organizational and situational factors. The
police literature on discretion clearly indicates that situational factors
are key to explaining what police do, and there is no reason to believe
this area of decision-making is any different. Scholars are particularly
encouraged to consider the effects of complainant/victim demo-
graphic and socioeconomic characteristics. Moreover, researchers
should consider aspects of demeanor, and if possible, legal evidence
present at the scene. Currently, inclusion of these variables is difﬁcult
based on existing police data systems. Call for service and police
incident data are notoriously plagued with missing data. The authors'
experiences also noted that situational-level variables are unavailable
with CFS data.
Lastly, effort should bemade to consider how organizational factors
inﬂuence recording practices. Herbert (1997), Klinger (1997, 2004),
and Rubinstein (1973) have recognized that organizational factors
impact ofﬁcer behavior. There also is a geographical component to
police recording behavior since deployment often occurs around
physical space. Thus, neighborhood factors can directly inﬂuence
ofﬁcer behavior through their own personal experience, or indirectly
through organizational mandates. As police data collection technology
improves (e.g., NIBRS) and departments rely on in-house research and
planning units, it is possible that researchers can better isolate the
plethora of neighborhood, situational, and organizational factors that
inﬂuence police behavior, particularly for less visible and less studied
decisions, such as the translation of reported crime.
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Notes
1. While this discretion is not without limits, the realities of police work (e.g.,
limited direct supervision and limited witnesses to an ofﬁcer's actions) afford ofﬁcers
considerable latitude in making dispositional decisions (see Klockers, 1985).
2. Maxﬁeld et al. (1980) employed a similar concept they referred to as the
“recording ratio.”
3. See Gottfredson and Gottfredson (1988) and Skogan and Frydl (2004) for more
comprehensive reviews of police discretion literature.
4. The authors recognize this statement represents a highly idealized description of
the role of police departments in contemporary society and is not without controversy.
The authors suggest, however, that this premise is both valid and appropriate within a
social disorganization framework.
5. The meaning of formalized police action is likely situation-dependent. When
citizens request the presence of the police, it is because they have a problem that can
best be reconciled through formal action. When police action is pursuant to proactive
police efforts, it is less likely that formalized action is welcomed by residents. The
authors would like to thank Dr. Barbara Warner for her helpful insight into this
perspective.
6. In contrast to Kubrin and Weitzer (2003) who view calling the police as formal
social control, Warner (2007) refers to this as indirect informal social control. Warner
(2007) argues that calling the police is indirect formal control because it involves
mobilizing a third party with formal authority to intervene in a problem. It also
represents informal control because it originates in the behaviors of residents
themselves (pp. 101-102). Warner's (2007) categories of social control appropriately
recognize that not all police involvement in crime is the same. That is, police resources
can be mobilized through proactive patrol strategies or reactively by citizens. The
former would be appropriately approximate formal control, in that it is mobilized by
police directly. The latter, in contrast, is considered informal in that it is mobilized by
citizens. For purposes of this research, Warner's (2007) conceptualization of calls to
the police as measures of indirect informal social control was utilized.
7. See http://www.sanantonio.gov/sapd/pdf/callsmonth.pdf for a monthly sum-
mary of CFS for the years 2000-2006 that is publicly available through SAPD's Web
site.
8. Like many large police departments, the dispatching function within SAPD is
comprised of two distinct functions, e.g. call takers and dispatchers. All SAPD related
911 calls are answered by call takers who average approximately thirty persons per
shift. If the event warrants a police ofﬁcer, call takers forward the call details
electronically to a set of seven dispatchers who cover all six police substations and the
trafﬁc unit. Typically if several calls are received by several different call takers relating
to the same event—this commonly happens with trafﬁc accidents—these are
recognized by the dispatcher. Occasionally multiple dispatches, and therefore multiple
case numbers, are assigned to a single event in error (San Antonio Police Department,
Crime Analysis Unit, personal communication, 2009).
9. It was not possible to disaggregate personal from commercial robbery with the
CFS data.
10. It was important to note that this scheme did not take into account if ofﬁcial
crime classiﬁcations were upgraded or downgraded in terms of crime type or
seriousness. Assaultive crimes, for example might be downgraded in the ofﬁcial crime
data as a “disorderly conduct” or a variety of other less serious criminal behaviors.
Thus, all CFS that appeared as ofﬁcially recorded crimes were considered “translated”
regardless of the degree of consistency between the event classiﬁcations. Warner
(1997) did not consider events that were substantially downgraded in terms of
seriousness as “recorded” events; this decision was not fully justiﬁed.
11. The number of excluded tracts varied across crime type. The largest number of
excluded tracts was for the more serious crime such as robbery (valid n=241) and
smallest number was for less serious crimes such as disturbances (valid n = 261).
Only eleven tracts were excluded in all analyses. These tracts largely included
industrial areas and special use tracts such as the San Antonio International Airport.
12. The race and ethnicity categories were not necessarily mutually exclusive of
each other, a fact that could possibly confound research using such distinctions. In San
Antonio, it was estimated that approximately 90 percent of Latinos self-identiﬁed as
“White” Latinos compared to Black Latinos (U.S. Census Bureau, 2002). The authors
would like to thank a reviewer for raising this issue.
13. The authors would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
14. Since there was no theoretical reason to expect that a “diffusion effect” existed
for the translation rate, spatial dependence was treated as a disturbance in the
normally distributed error term rather than as a consequence of a spatially lagged
variable.
15. Tests for multicollinearity were run for each of the nine models detailed below
using SPSS. The results indicated only moderate problems, particularly for variables
percent Latino and percent foreign born. The variance inﬂation factor (VIF) scores for
these variables ranged from 4 to 5 across models. Although slightly higher than the
traditional VIF cutoff of 4.0, both were simultaneously left in the model because they
tapped two distinct dimensions of the Latino population, especially in a city with large
percentages of recent immigrants. Beyond these concerns, all additional VIFs were
well below the 4.0 cutoff across models.
16. Spatial regression included one additional parameter (lambda) estimate in the
output that measured if there were spatially correlated error terms. A signiﬁcant
estimate for lambda suggests the error terms were signiﬁcantly correlated, and thus,
use of the spatial regression model with estimated spatial weights improved the
overall ﬁt of the data. The spatial error term was only signiﬁcant for the burglary
model.
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